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The question of the ethical status of Marx's analysis of 
capitalism has provoked considerable disagreement among 
scholars in recent years, and in Britain the contributions of 
Norman Geras have done much to clarify the important points at 
issue.1 In this article I will offer some criticisms of 
Geras's position while arguing that an appreciation of the 
Greek dimension of Marx's thought helps to shed light on the 
origins of the ethical outlook implicit in his social theory.  
 The tension in Marx's social science is clear. He 
disdained ethical discourse and consistently opposed 
moralistic interventions in the social and political issues of 
his day, once proclaiming that `communists do not preach 
morality at all.'2  He showed no interest in abstract 
discussions about how and why individuals ought to act towards 
each other in a morally defensible way, and he argued that 
capitalism had either destroyed morality or turned it into a 
palpable lie.3 Attempts to build support for socialist ideas 
on moral precepts were viewed as distractions from the 
priority of confronting the underlying causes of social misery 
in the processes of material production.4 Yet his work is 
replete with indignant descriptions of the dehumanising power 
of capital, expressed in clearly moral terms. Although in 
general I am sympathetic with attempts to draw out the ethical 
dimension of Marx's thought, I will argue that Geras is wrong 
to designate the tension as a `pervasive contradiction'5 and 
that it is possible to explicate Marx's position without 
  
 
resorting to Geras's argument that `Marx did think capitalism 
was unjust but did not think he thought so.'6 I will argue 
that Marx operated from a position of `qualified relativism' 
with regards to justice, accepting that capitalism was just in 
its own terms but exposing the limitations and inadequacy of 
that justice in terms of a socialist alternative which was 
developing within capitalism itself. I question Geras's 
conclusion that Marx implicitly condemns capitalism as unjust 
by reference to a `generalised moral entitlement' to control 
over the means of production, which, is, in effect, a natural 
right.7 Finally, I take issue with his suggestion that Marx 
considered that the working class could dispense with ideals 
in their struggle for socialism. 
 Geras argues that there is a real and deep-seated 
inconsistency in Marx's work between his acceptance of 
capitalism as `just' and the moral language which he uses to 
condemn it. On the one hand, Marx argues that the process 
through which surplus value is produced is just, as each mode 
of production has norms of justice appropriate to it. For 
example, in the third volume of Capital he states that the 
content of capitalist contracts is just `so long as it 
corresponds to the mode of production and is adequate to it,'8 
and he makes the same point in the Critique of the Gotha 
Programme.9 In the first volume of Capital he specifically 
denies that an injustice has been done to the seller of labour 
power when the capitalist makes a profit,10 or that the seller 
has been defrauded.11  On the other hand, Marx condemns 
  
 
capitalism in moral terms which amount, in Geras's view, to 
deeming it unjust. In various parts of the first volume of 
Capital he describes the extraction of surplus value as 
`robbing', `stealing', `pumping booty' out of the workers, and 
`embezzling',12 and elsewhere he refers to it `in plain 
language' as `loot' and `the theft of alien labour time.'13 
Geras concludes that Marx makes transhistorical moral 
judgements while simultaneously holding the view that all 
principles of justice are specific to each mode of production 
and cannot be used to judge practices in other modes.  
 A number of writers have argued that it is not 
necessarily a contradiction to maintain a relativist view of 
justice and at the same time criticise capitalism in moral 
terms. George Brenkert, Steven Lukes, and Allen Wood14 have 
separately argued that Marx's condemnation of capitalism 
rested on values such as freedom and self-actualisation, but 
not on a conception of justice based on eternal principles. 
Joseph McCarney has argued that the moral language employed by 
Marx in describing exploitation need not necessarily be 
treated at the same theoretical level as the concept of 
justice. He suggests that in Marx's work we can separate 
justice, as `relativised to a particular social order' from 
evaluations which have `some element of transhistorical 
meaning,' for, after all, it is common enough to regard 
justice as `contextually bound and specifically juridical.'15  
I think that on this point McCarney is fundamentally correct, 
but Geras quite reasonably demands to see some evidence to 
  
 
support and explain the point that this was what Marx was 
doing.16 In what follows I will attempt to clarify Marx's 
conception of justice as one of `qualified relativism' and 
suggest that it owes much to his early immersion in the 
philosophy and culture of Ancient Greece.  
 A key feature of Marx's ethical position is his 
conception of human essence, a conception which Geras has done 
much to defend.17 I have argued elsewhere that his conception 
of human essence serves as an ethical foundation for his 
social theory.18 Marx considers that what makes us 
distinctively human is our ability to produce creatively and 
socially, a conception which combines thinking and doing. The 
products of human endeavour are the material evidence of our 
distinctiveness, `the open book of man's essential powers,'19  
but in successive modes of production the producers do not 
experience this power as their own. The mass of producers have 
never controlled the productive process. The human essence is 
realised throughout history, but always in distorted or 
perverted forms. In the emergence and further development of 
capitalism as a global system imbued with inescapable 
structural contradictions, Marx sees the opportunity for the 
producers to take control over the production processes and 
bring their existence into harmony with their essence, thereby 
announcing the end of the `prehistory' of human society.20 This 
outlook is essentialist and teleological and reflects Marx's 
enduring attachment to Ancient Greek thought. Like Aristotle, 
Marx defines the human essence not simply in factual terms but 
  
 
with the implication that it ought to be fulfilled. Its 
projected fulfilment in communist society is conceived in epic 
terms as the end of a long journey of successive class 
struggles. 
 When Marx deals with the unfairness of the labour 
contract in capitalism he does so in explicitly dialectical 
terms. Geras accuses Marx of resorting to `dialectical 
wizardry' in arguing that equal exchange is transformed into 
unequal exchange.21 In the Grundrisse he proposes that `by a 
peculiar logic the right of property on the side of capital is 
dialectically transformed into the right to an alien 
product...the right to appropriate alien labour without 
equivalent.'22 In the first volume of Capital he writes that 
`to the extent that commodity production, in accordance with 
its own immanent laws, undergoes a further development into 
capitalist production, the property laws of commodity 
production must undergo a dialectical inversion so that they 
become laws of capitalist appropriation.'23 Behind the 
appearance of the exchange of equivalents lies the essence of 
exploitation. In unmasking the extraction of surplus value 
hidden behind the rhetoric of the free exchange of 
equivalents, Marx shows how power is wrested from the 
producers and re-presented to them in the forms of money or 
capital as alien powers standing above them.24 The worker, when 
exchanging his labour capacity with the capitalist, 
`surrenders its creative power, like Esau who gave up his 
birthright for a mess of pottage.'25 This loss of freedom is 
  
 
inscribed in capitalism's defining process, the extraction of 
surplus value arising from the purchase and sale of labour 
power. For Marx, the deprivation of the creative power of 
labour from the worker is a perversion of the human essence. 
 Geras objects that Marx's resort to the dialectic in 
discussing the rights and wrongs of the labour contract only 
muddies the water, as the wage relation is either an exchange 
of equivalents and therefore just, or it is not, and `a thing 
cannot be its opposite.' He concludes that the confusion among 
commentators on this point is therefore `a fruit of Marx's own 
prevarication.'26 This fundamental criticism of Marx's use of 
dialectic is somewhat surprising in view of Geras's earlier 
work on the appearance/essence distinction in Marx,27 but it 
requires us to think more carefully about Marx's work on 
essence and appearance and how it fits in with the ethical 
position implicit in his work. With this in mind I will now 
turn to the Greek dimension of Marx's thought.  
 
 
THE GREEK DIMENSION 
 
Marx began to forge his social theory in an intellectual 
milieu dominated by the ghost of Hegel and the iconoclastic 
Feuerbach, but the more distant voices of Ancient Greece 
resonate in the German philosophical debates of the early 
nineteenth century and were particularly significant in Marx's 
education. I do not wish to elevate Aristotle as a major 
  
 
influence on Marx's social theory at the expense of Hegel,28 
but rather work from the assumption that both Hegel's idea of 
ethical community (Sittlichkeit) and Marx's vision of 
communist society owe a great deal to their independent 
absorption of Greek philosophy.29 German intellectual life in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was prone to 
`Graecomania', following the rediscovery of Greek art by 
Johann Winckelmann.30 Michael De Golyer refers to a Greek 
`fetishism' in Germany, with Berlin the undisputed centre of 
classical scholarship, crowned in 1831 by the commencement of 
the publication of the first modern edition of Aristotle's 
works.31 Marx was steeped in Greek and Latin culture at school 
and later at University, and his library contained numerous 
volumes of Greek and Roman texts, most of them in the original 
language.32 His doctoral thesis was a highly original 
comparison of the natural philosophy of Democritus and 
Epicurus, and the preparatory work involved extensive reading 
of Aristotle's work. Marx referred to Aristotle as the 
`genius' and `the greatest thinker of antiquity,'33 and he 
regarded Epicurus as `the greatest representative of Greek 
Enlightenment' and `the true radical Enlightener of 
antiquity.'34   
 Let us first consider the affinities between Marx's 
philosophy and the ethics of Greek culture as displayed in the 
epic literature to which he returned throughout his life. As 
Julia Annas has written, the central element of Greek ethics 




reconciled.35 This is exemplified in the Homeric epics, the 
Iliad and the Odyssey, in which the extremes of brutality and 
suffering are brought to resolution with a sense of integrity 
earned through hard experience. Of all the Greek myths, the 
story of Prometheus made the biggest impact on Marx, who even 
described this fictional character as `the most eminent saint 
and martyr in the philosophical calendar.'36. Prometheus (the 
`foreseer') stole fire from the Gods and empowered humanity, 
and the Gods took vengeance by having him bound to a rock for 
thousands of years. At night he froze and by day his liver was 
pecked at by birds, but he endured his sufferings, eventually 
to be freed and reconciled with the God Zeus.37  This idea of 
achieving ultimate resolution only through the experience of 
heroic struggle is a leitmotif in Marx's political writings. 
For example, in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte he 
depicts proletarian revolutions as throwing down their 
adversary `only in order that he may draw new strength from 
the earth and rise again, more gigantic, before them, and 
recoil again and again from the indefinite prodigiousness of 
their own aims, until a situation has been created which makes 
all turning back impossible.'38 In The Poverty of Philosophy 
Marx, quoting George Sand, concludes that the last word of 
social science will always be `combat or death, bloody 
struggle or nothingness.'39
 The distinctive elements of Greek ethical philosophy 
which, I argue, throw light on the ethics implicit in Marx's 




Justice. A number of scholars have noted the similarity 
between the essentialism of Aristotle and Marx,40  and, as 
Scott Meikle has pointed out, that Marx made the first German 
translation of Aristotle's De Anima, the text in which 
Aristotle discusses what makes us distinctive from other 
animals.41 Aristotle, at the beginning of the Politics, sets 
down his essentialism: 
  all things derive their essential character from 
their function and their capacity; and it follows 
that if they are no longer fit to discharge their 
function, we ought not to say that they are still 
the same things, but only that, by an ambiguity, 
they still have the same names.42
For both Aristotle and Marx our sociality and rationality are 
elements of our human essence, and the exercise of these 
capacities must be the proper function of a human being. 
Aristotle is concerned with the virtuous self-development of 
citizens, who, ultimately, must have the opportunity to engage 
in the contemplation of truth to achieve eudaemonia, or 
happiness.43  Marx's view of what constitutes our essence goes 
further than specifying our capacity to reason. We are 
certainly moral beings, but the proof of our distinctiveness 
is shown in our production, in our conscious life activity. He 
views the self-realisation of human essence as the end or 
telos of historical development. Only with the abolition of 
private property and its replacement by communist society can 
the human essence of creative social activity be realised by 
  
 
all humanity. What is assumed here is a universal ethical 
community based on cooperation, and without it, we are not 
fully free.  
 There is a sense in which Marx appears to move closer to 
the Aristotelian conception of freedom in his mature work. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, early in his career Marx 
conceived of humanity expressing its freedom through the 
satisfying experience of cooperative labour and interactive 
exchange, but in the famous passages on the realm of freedom 
in the third volume of Capital he acknowledges that true 
freedom is possible only when we are entirely free from 
necessity.44 As Marx comments earlier in that work, for 
Aristotle this freedom was rendered possible only when others 
performed the work, not simply the labour but also the 
supervision of the labour. Marx envisaged the achievement of 
freedom through minimising necessary labour time by the 
employment of cooperative planning and advanced technology. 
Interestingly, he pointed out in the first volume of Capital 
that Aristotle conjured the ideal image of production by self-
activated machines which rendered labour unnecessary.45 Marx 
also refers in Capital to Aristotle's contempt for money-
lending, expressed in the Politics, in which profit from 
money-lending has `justice disapproved' because it is based on 
`mutual cheating.' The usurer is `rightly hated' because he is 
using money for purposes for which it was not invented.46 In 
other words the usurer is perverting the essence of money, 
which lies in facilitating the exchange of commodities. He 
  
 
condemns traders as kapelos, or hucksters, because their 
activities undermine the bonds which hold the community 
together. Marx's analysis of money ruled out the idea that 
money could operate in a `purer' way through schemes such as 
`labour money,' as suggested by the followers of Proudhon, but 
the attention given to this issue in the Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy reveals his appreciation of 
Aristotle's thoughts on the role of money in society.47  
 Essentialism is often rejected on the grounds that it 
falls into the trap of the naturalistic fallacy of deriving an 
`ought' from an `is'. How can we infer a moral commitment from 
an essence which is defined in factual and descriptive terms? 
It may be true that human beings are essentially human because 
of their social creativity, but this does not tell us why the 
realisation of this essence ought to be regarded as a morally 
desirable goal. One answer to this has been provided by 
Richard Norman, who suggests that Marx, unlike Aristotle, 
relies not on essentialist arguments for justifying his goal 
of self-realisation, but on empirical ones, that is, he points 
to widespread dissatisfaction if human existence continues to 
be alienated.48 This is true, but it makes it no less of an 
essentialist argument. The important thing to bear in mind is 
that the definition of essence is not simply a factual one but 
has values built into it. Alasdair MacIntyre, in After Virtue, 
argues that values are often built in to premises, 
particularly when the premises are of a functional kind. In 
the case of Aristotle his ethical theory is couched in 
  
 
functional terms - the relationship of `man' to `living well' 
is likened to a harpist playing the harp well.49 In Marx the 
human essence is located in our capacity for social 
creativity, which encompasses our capacity to regulate our 
lives in a moral way. The `ought' is built in to what it is to 
be human, so in effect we are deriving an `ought' from an 
`ought'. Philip Kain, in Marx and Ethics, recognises 
similarities in the essentialism of Aristotle and Marx, and 
rightly argues that for Marx values are embedded in our 
essence. He accepts that it is illegitimate to deduce moral 
conclusions from non-moral premises, but if real-world facts 
already have values embedded in them, then we can derive 
values from these facts.50  MacIntyre and Kain are correct in 
arguing that values are embedded in Marx's view of what it is 
to be human; as Mihailo Markovic has concluded, in Marx the 
`is' is always infused with the `ought'.51  
 According to Aristotle, the nature of a thing is its end, 
or telos, `the final form attained in an entity's process of 
development.'52 Teleology has long been an unfashionable 
philosophical concept often equated with irrationalism or 
mysticism because it understands past and present developments 
in terms of a purpose or final cause. Yet there is nothing 
mystical in realising that, for example, we can understand the 
nature of an acorn only if we know that its natural 
development will produce an oak. This perspective may be 
extended to help us make sense of historical development, as 




that `the final cause of the World at large' is the successive 
unfolding of human freedom.53  Marx adopted a teleological 
approach, not simply as an assertion of historical 
inevitability, but in his endeavour to uncover `the special 
laws that regulate the origin, existence, development and 
death of a given social organism and its replacement by 
another, higher one.' This description of his method by a 
reviewer of Capital was received with approbation by Marx as 
an accurate summary of his dialectical method.54  
 In the Introduction to the Grundrisse Marx considered why 
people continued to derive immense aesthetic pleasure from 
Greek art and epic poetry when the conditions which gave rise 
to it had so little in common with those of his day: 
  An adult cannot become a child again, or he becomes 
childish. But does not the naivete of the child give 
him pleasure, and must he not himself endeavour to 
reproduce the child's veracity on a higher level? 
Does not the specific character of every epoch come 
to life again in its natural veracity in the child's 
nature? Why should not the historical childhood of 
humanity, where it attained its most beautiful form, 
exert an eternal charm as a stage that will never 
recur?55
This plea to reproduce the truth revealed by children at a 
higher level brings out the teleological nature of his own 
thought. He conjures an image of history as an odyssey, a 
wandering journey striving for a peaceful home. As he stood on 
  
 
the threshold of committing himself to communism Marx 
commented that the feeling for freedom had vanished from the 
world with the Greeks, but can `again transform society into a 
community of human beings united for their highest aims, into 
a democratic state.'56 Marx here shows a higher regard for the 
Greek conception of freedom than Hegel. As Horst Mewes has 
commented, Marx can be seen as one of the last major figures 
to be `under the influence of a peculiarly German version of 
the dialogue between ancient and modern dominant during the 
eighteenth century.'57  Marx saw communism as the realisation 
of human freedom, the rational culmination of a long process 
of struggle.  
 More often than not teleology is regarded as irrational, 
but Scott Meikle has rightly denied that Marx's teleological 
thought involves an `occultism' in which the future acts 
causally upon the present, nor one in which teleological 
change is `the fulfilment of the design of a hidden purpose.'58 
Teleological argument does not imply that a final cause acts 
as an agent in place of an efficient cause.59 Marx's theory of 
history is teleological, because ir projects the rise of 
capitalism as inexorable and its end as inevitable, but his 
projected alternative has to be struggled for, within the 
constraints of the given conditions, without guarantees. There 
are, of course, undoubtedly polemical pieces written by Marx 
in which he writes with excessive certitude about the future 
victory of the proletariat. For example, in 1848 he claims 
that the fall of the bourgeoisie and the victory of the 
  
 
proletariat were `equally inevitable', and in 1871 he refers 
to `that higher form to which present society is irresistibly 
tending by its own economical agencies.'60 A teleological 
approach may encourage these exaggerated predictions, but it 
also encourages an examination of immanent tendencies so that 
we can anticipate certain possible outcomes and formulate 
strategies accordingly. I shall argue later, contra Geras, 
that the teleological approach does not dispense with ideals, 
but only insists that they are infused with a strict sense of 
realism.   
 Does Marx's commitment to the goal of human freedom imply 
a belief in the imminent appearance of a perfect society? This 
is the caricature suggested by Lukes, who imputes to Marx a 
perfectionism with connotations of a complacent life free from 
disagreement and bereft of ambition.61 Noting that Marx had 
nothing but contempt for the morality of Recht, or civil 
rights, Lukes points to social relations in an imaginary 
socialist society and concludes that `even high-level, 
communally related angels stand in need of Recht.'62 Marx 
criticised appeals to civil rights because they offered the 
false promise of social harmony by bestowing rights to 
individuals against the state, leaving untouched the problem 
of the separation of the private from the public sphere. He 
opposed the idea that a commitment to the `rights of man' 
could provide human emancipation while leaving untouched the 
structures of an alienated, privatised, society.63 He also 
noted that what civil rights could provide - political 
  
 
emancipation or democracy - was often set to one side if the 
interests of the ruling class were endangered.64 There is 
nothing at all to suggest, as Lukes does, that Marx had no 
place for laws in a socialist society. For Marx, Recht belongs 
to the bourgeois state, and the essence of the bourgeois state 
is that it reflects the domination of that class. A classless 
society would obviously need political and administrative 
institutions, but they would not constitute a state by Marx's 
definition, and therefore laws would not amount to Recht. 
Lukes's reference to the `angels' of communist society imputes 
to Marx a romanticism which he flatly rejected. His vision of 
emancipated humanity needs no angels, only the democratic 
removal of the last `antagonistic social relations of 
production.'65 Differences of various sorts would naturally 
continue as real human history begins to unfold for the first 
time, but the differences would not be grounded in 
exploitation or oppression. The assumption is not one of 
perfect concord, but of genuine democratic assent to whatever 
processes are instituted to settle such differences.66 Without 
differences of opinion there would be nothing left to 
criticise, an occupation which Marx personally looked forward 
to in the future society.67   
 Turning now to the concept of justice, we know that Marx 
was familiar with the somewhat ambiguous remarks of Aristotle 
and Epicurus on the relationship between natural justice and 
legal justice. In the first volume of Capital Marx praises 




form in political economy.68  Aristotle recognised that for 
commodities to be exchanged fairly they must be commensurable 
in some way. The standard of measure was demand, and this was 
expressed through the medium of money. However, although money 
expresses commensurability it does not explain it, and in 
Marx's opinion the reason that Aristotle failed to recognise 
that labour was the common ingredient in the value of 
commodities was that he lived in a slave society, based on 
human inequality; 
  The secret of the expression of value, namely the 
equality and equivalence of all kinds of labour 
because and insofar as they are human labour in 
general, could not be deciphered until the concept 
of human equality had already acquired the 
permanence of a fixed popular opinion.69
The passages to which Marx refers are taken from Book V of the 
Nichomachean Ethics, which is devoted to justice. Aristotle's 
ideas on justice here, stressing fairness and reciprocity, 
would have had radical implications if he had adopted a labour 
theory of value, for he would have established a just 
entitlement for slaves. Clearly this was not his intention, 
and yet there is plenty of ammunition both here and in the 
condemnation of usury in the Politics for Marx to make use of 
in his critique of political economy.  
 In this part of the Ethics we see Aristotle stressing the 
importance of proportional reciprocation as the basis for fair 
exchange and condemning the extremes of `excess and 
  
 
deficiency' as unjust. Without reciprocity there is no social 
bond and the state cannot hold together.70 In bourgeois 
political economy the claim is made that there is reciprocity 
and fairness in the labour contract, but the society throws up 
immense extremes of `excess and deficiency' and, in Marx's 
view, is unsustainable as a social formation. Michael de 
Golyer argues that Aristotle's concept of justice and Marx's 
concept of equality are `obverse and reverse of the same 
concept, community.'71 Aristotle thought that equals ought to 
be treated equally, but appeared willing to accept whatever 
social divisions existed in any particular society. Marx was 
committed to equality for all human beings, and this is a 
vital part of the ethical underpinning of his work. 
 The philosophy of Epicurus held a powerful attraction for 
the young Marx, who was particularly impressed by his 
commitment to a life without illusions; he described Epicurus 
as the `atheistic philosopher par excellence.'72 For Epicurus, 
freedom was conceived as freedom from fear, and fear was often 
fear of the unknown; knowledge was therefore central to 
overcoming fear. Coming after the eclipse of Athenian 
democracy, Epicurus chose to shun politics and favour a 
contemplative life of balanced mental and physical pleasures 
in a condition of ataraxia, or serenity, a feature of which 
was friendship, conceived as a non-instrumental end.73 Although 
Marx was quintessentially a political philosopher, it seems to 




in communist society, empowered by knowledge and living free 
from fear, has Epicurean resonances.74
 Epicurus's views on justice (as presented by Diogenes 
Laertius) were copied out by Marx in the preparatory notebooks 
he made in 1839 for his doctoral dissertation. Their 
significance to Marx are clearly shown by the exceptional 
emphasis he gives them in the margin.75 Indeed six years later, 
in The German Ideology, when praising Epicurus as the founder 
of social contract theory, the textual evidence he cites is in 
the passages in question.76 Epicurus argues that justice exists 
only in mutual relations, and changes according to whether it 
is expedient for those mutual relations; what was once right 
can become no longer right if it ceases to serve its original 
purpose. If somebody stipulates a system of justice, it has 
the `essence' of justice if it is valid for everyone, but this 
validity is socially grounded. If the system does not in fact 
aid `mutual intercourse' it loses that essence. Epicurus 
couches his views on justice in paradoxical form: 
  In general, the same justice is valid for all (for 
it is something useful in mutual intercourse); but 
the special conditions of the country and the 
totality of other possible grounds bring it about 
that the same justice is not valid for all.77  
An important phrase here is `the totality of other possible 
grounds,' for it points to the possibility of higher forms of 
justice which must, however, be based on what is materially 
possible. In this way Epicurus introduces a historical 
  
 
dimension to the discussion of justice. I will argue later 
that this is precisely what Marx does in his discussion of 
`equal right' in the Critique of the Gotha Programme. It 
should be noted, however, that for Epicurus the higher form of 
justice belonged not to the future but to the recent past, to 
the democratic period which had been destroyed by the 
Macedonian victory over Greece.78 He speaks of old systems of 
justice losing their utility but continuing to embrace the 
conception or essence of justice, and therefore being right 
for those `who do not let themselves be deluded by empty 
talk.' This amounts to a civil disobedience argument and an 
appeal to moral conscience. Epicurus therefore held a 
historical relativist view of justice while the central thrust 
of his teaching was directed towards promoting ataraxia. His 
doctrine was individualistic rather than social, a spiritual 
transcendence of the problems generated by the defeat of the 
democratic community, but the passages on justice point to the 
possibility of achieving social harmony. It is also 
interesting to note that his views on the perverting power of 
money share the naturalistic outlook of Aristotle which was 
adopted by Marx. Epicurus argues that gold `easily robbed the 
strong and beautiful of honour, for...however strong men are 
born, however beautiful their body, they follow the lead of 
the richer men.'79  
 
 




Let us now return to Marx's views on justice and his criticism 
of capitalism. He states that capitalism is just, in the sense 
that legal justice or `right' (Recht) `can never be higher 
than the economic structure and its cultural development which 
this determines.'80 Yet clearly Marx's discussion of 
exploitation is full of moral indignation. On what ethical 
grounds does he make this condemnation, and why does he 
distinguish his allegations of unfairness from the concept of 
justice? One way in which he does this is effectively to 
disclose the inconsistencies in the liberal claims to justice 
and fairness, a form of moral realism in which he exposes the 
hypocrisy of capitalist justice. The point of describing the 
labour contract as both `just'  and `theft' is to point up the 
gap between appearance and essence in the system in order to 
expose the class partiality of its justificatory camouflage. 
Marx is seeking to reveal the cant of capitalist moral claims, 
as, for example, in his 1848 speech on free trade when he 
derisively comments that `to call cosmopolitan exploitation 
universal brotherhood is an idea that could only be engendered 
in the brain of the bourgeoisie.'81 This is an interesting 
example because Marx in fact favours free trade because it is 
progressive, which, in his assessment of the vector of 
capitalism, meant that it would hasten the social revolution. 
If Marx had stated that free trade helped to develop a 
thoroughly unjust society, he would have found it difficult to 
  
 
support it, but what he can do is expose the partiality of the 
capitalist conceptions of justice, fairness, and brotherhood. 
 Marx's comments on the idea of `equal right' in the 
future socialist society in the Critique of the Gotha 
Programme provide the clearest evidence of Marx's qualified 
relativism. He argues that capitalist distribution `is the 
only "fair" distribution on the basis of the present-day mode 
of production,'82 the inverted commas implying that there could 
be other, more socially acceptable, standards of fairness. In 
a similar vein in the first draft of The Civil War in France 
he had written that `every social form of property has 
"morals" of its own.'83 In the Critique Marx argues that under 
socialism, when private property has been abolished, `equal 
right' would involve distribution to individuals according to 
an equal standard, labour, but as individuals are different in 
strength and ability, equal right would give unequal rewards. 
An important point here is that equal right in socialist 
society is considered an advance on bourgeois society because 
`principle and practice are no longer at loggerheads.'84 In 
Marx's view, under socialism equal right would cease to be a 
mere semblance and the standard by which the remuneration 
operated would be transparent. However, it would still be 
based on individual reward, with the possibility of creating 
different sorts of division in society. He prefers, as the 
distributive principle of the `higher phase, of communist 
society' the formula `from each according to abilities to each 
according to needs,'85 achievable presumably through an agreed 
  
 
increase in the free provision of goods and services.  His 
preference for the latter implicitly rests on a conviction 
that it is fairer than distribution based on individual 
reward, but the question remains as to what standard of 
fairness Marx is appealing. 
 The line of argument that comes closes to explicating and 
defending Marx's position is the one put forward by Sean 
Sayers, although his contributions have been strongly 
criticised by Geras. Sayers argues that Marx judged capitalism 
not by transhistorical standards but by socialist standards 
which develop within capitalism itself.86 He cites Marx's 
comments in the third volume of Capital where he speculates 
that from the standpoint of `a higher economic form of 
society' private ownership of property will one day appear as 
absurd as slavery does in advanced capitalist societies.87 
Sayers' argument is in line with the essentialist and 
teleological perspective which Marx developed from his 
encounters with Ancient Greece and, of course, with Hegel, and 
the idea of progress is central to it.88  Geras objects that as 
soon as we introduce the idea of progress we necessarily 
invoke `transcendent criteria' which enable us to compare one 
kind of society with another to see in which respects they are 
superior.89 He argues that an appeal to progress does not 
provide a reason why something should be valued or fought for, 
and he insists that if we are to argue that the socialist end 
of history is morally superior to capitalism we are obliged to 
provide  `suitably general, ethically pertinent criteria' for 
  
 
doing so.90 If we provide such criteria for progress we are 
offering universal evaluative standards and cannot then deny 
that Marx operated with such standards. 
 I have argued that Marx's projected goal was the 
fulfilment of the human essence of social creativity, but the 
possibility of fully realising this goal cannot arise until 
certain conditions have been met. The problem with the demand 
that we recognise universal or transhistorical principles of 
justice is precisely that their formulation becomes 
suprahistorical. It suggests that we judge societies according 
to criteria which were not available to those societies. It 
replaces old forms of moral universalism with another when 
Marx was adamant that there was no source of morality higher 
than that provided by society.  Sayers cites an interesting 
passage from the British Hegelian Bradley to the effect that 
all morality is and must be `relative' because the essence of 
realisation is evolution through stages, and existence in some 
one stage is not final. Bradley repeats the essentialist 
argument that at every stage the essence of man is realised, 
however imperfectly, and only later can we see the 
deficiencies of an earlier stage, but `the demand for a code 
of right in itself, apart from any stage, is seen to be the 
asking for an impossibility.'91 I think this qualified 
relativism is true for Marx, as well as Aristotle, Epicurus, 
and Hegel. Marx's dialectical presentation of the tension 
between the justice of the capitalist labour contract and the 
workers' experience of its operation as palpably unfair shows 
  
 
how capitalist justice engenders its opposition and begs for a 
resolution which is compatible with the full realisation of 
human potential.   
 To return to Geras's claim that Marx is implicitly 
claiming a moral entitlement to social control of the means of 
production as a form of natural right, this raises some 
interesting questions. It seems to me that Marx is not doing 
this, but he is obviously committed to the idea of a society 
that will award itself such an entitlement as an necessary 
condition for social harmony. Although there is an element of 
naturalism in his stance, in that he sees communist society as 
providing for the realisation of the human essence, it is not 
a natural rights argument in any conventional use of the term. 
As David Bakhurst has argued, Marx rejects the idea of eternal 
moral principles and insists that all normative codes are 
created and sustained by particular communities.92 Bakhurst 
goes further in his defence of the coherence of Marx's ethical 
stance. He argues that Marx accepts that there are usually 
answers available to moral questions on the basis of our 
communal forms of practice and that the ability to make moral 
judgements is a perceptual capacity which has its origin in 
socialisation and will develop with communal activity. Such a 
view enables us to understand Marx's confidence in attacking 
the hypocrisy of bourgeois moral universalism without 
presenting an alternative universalism of a similar kind. The 
morality of a free society would have to be decided by that 
free society. This, in my reading, would be an expression of 
  
 
the full realisation of the human essence of social 
creativity. The strength of this approach is that it 
reintegrates ethics into the constitution of the life of the 
community and allows for the emergence of an ethical spirit of 
the sort which Marx admired in Athenian democracy. 
 
 
POLITICS WITHOUT IDEALS? 
 
To state the obvious, Marx overestimated the extent to which 
the further development of capitalism would produce an 
irresistible movement towards socialism. For those who still 
regard democratic socialism as the only system which will 
enable humankind to flourish, there is perhaps a greater need 
than ever before to criticise the operation of global 
capitalism as perverse and dehumanising. I think Marx did this 
without resorting to conventional moralism, but I cannot 
accept Geras's argument that Marx denied that the working 
class could somehow dispense with ideals. Geras concedes that 
in staying clear of moralising criticism Marx is able to make 
a strong scientific analysis of capitalism, but insists that 
this does not `make good or excuse the deficiency'93 involved 
in his hostility to moral argument. As an example of Marx's 
bad practice he cites this example from The Civil War in 
France: 
 The working class...know that in order to work out their 




which present society is irresistibly tending by its own 
economical agencies, they will have to pass through long 
struggles, through a series of historic processes, 
transforming circumstances and men. They have no ideals 
to realise, but to set free elements of the new society 
with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is 
pregnant.94
Geras complains that in this passage Marx denies the validity 
of ideals, leaving only `the immanent movement and that is 
that.'95 Yet the process of `setting free' elements of a higher 
form of society implies multiple choices and wholesale 
transformations, and is here presented as the only realisable 
ideal; in other words setting free the elements of the new 
society is an ideal.96 Indeed in the first draft Marx specifies 
that it is the setting free of social forms of production from 
`the trammels of slavery.'97 Written after a calamity of such 
enormity that it would deter all but the boldest from entering 
political struggle, Marx wanted to assure the oppressed that 
they had more than pious hopes to rely on, and that their 
oppressors were not omnipotent. At the end of the text on the 
Paris Commune Marx writes that `its martyrs are enshrined in 
the great heart of the working class,' presupposing not only a 
collective subject but one with a moral purpose, fired by a 
collective memory. The `exterminators' of the Commune were to 
be `nailed to that eternal pillory from which all the prayers 
of their priests will not avail to redeem them.'98 Marx was 





development of a socialist consciousness, and that people were 
spurred to action by passionate hatred for callous and brutal 
oppression. However, he was surely correct to advise that 
action be guided by analysis of what could be achieved in the 
given conditions and circumstances.  
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